What your cell phone can’t tell the police (The New Yorker, 26 June 2014) – On May 28th, Lisa Marie Roberts, of Portland, Oregon, was released from prison after serving nine and a half years for a murder she didn’t commit. A key piece of overturned evidence was cell-phone records that allegedly put her at the scene. Roberts pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 2004, after her court-appointed attorney persuaded her that she had no hope of acquittal. The state’s attorney had told him that phone records had put Roberts at the scene of the crime, and, to her lawyer, that was almost as damning as DNA. But he was wrong, as are many other attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and juries, who overestimate the precision of cell-phone location records. Rather than pinpoint a suspect’s whereabouts, cell-tower records can put someone within an area of several hundred square miles or, in a congested urban area, several square miles. Yet years of prosecutions and plea bargains have been based on a misunderstanding of how cell networks operate. No one knows how often this occurs, but each year police make more than a million requests for cell-phone records. “We think the whole paradigm is absolutely flawed at every level, and shouldn’t be used in the courtroom,” Michael Cherry, the C.E.O. of Cherry Biometrics, a consulting firm in Falls Church, Virginia, told me. “This whole thing is junk science, a farce.” The paradigm is the assumption that, when you make a call on your cell phone, it automatically routes to the nearest cell tower, and that by capturing those records police can determine where you made a call-and thus where you were-at a particular time. That, he explained, is not how the system works. When you hit “send” on your cell phone, a complicated series of events takes place that is governed by algorithms and proprietary software, not just by the location of the cell tower. First, your cell phone sends out a radio-frequency signal to the towers within a radius of up to roughly twenty miles-or fewer, in urban areas-depending on the topography and atmospheric conditions.

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Image courtesy of FreeDigitalPhotos.net/nokhoog_buchachon.

US oil & gas industry establishes information sharing center (InfoSecurity, 26 June 2014) – As part of a voluntary effort, the oil and natural gas industry is launching the Oil and Natural Gas Information Sharing and Analysis Center ( ONG-ISAC ), dedicated to protecting critical energy infrastructure from computer-based attacks. The ONG-ISAC will serve as a unified, central reservoir of cyber intelligence and a virtual pipeline that facilitates the secure sharing of vetted, actionable and timely cyber intelligence to members. “Cyber-based attacks are one of the fastest-growing threats to America’s infrastructure,” said David Frazier, chairman of the ONG-ISAC, in a statement. “ONG-ISAC will help our industry to quickly identify and respond to threats against refineries, pipelines and other distribution systems that serve US consumers and businesses. It also will provide industry participants a secure way to share information and stay connected with law enforcement agencies.” An industry-owned and operated organization, the ONG-ISAC will facilitate the exchange of information, evaluate risks, and provide up-to-date security guidance to US companies. Participants can submit incidents either anonymously or with attribution via a secure web portal; circulate information on threats and vulnerabilities among ONG-ISAC members, other ISACs, vendors and the US government; provide industry participants with access to cybersecurity experts; alert participants of cyber-threats deemed ‘urgent’ or ‘elevated’ in near real-time, within 60 minutes; coordinate industry-wide responses to computer-based attacks; and ensure compliance with all antitrust and federal disclosure guidelines.

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Image courtesy of FreeDigitalPhotos.net/sheelamohan.